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IN TIIR UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
BRIAN DALE LARSEN,

:

Case No. 20080519-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
A defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities for which
he did not admit responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution.
This Court, therefore, should reverse the restitution order because the record shows that
Larscn did not admit responsibility for, was not convicted of, and did not agree to pay
restitution for the vehicle damage. Accepting the State's argument to the contrary would
require this Court to attempt to analyze Larscn's state of mind and to make inferences.
Such leaps across gaps in the record evidence arc not permitted by the restitution statute.
First, Larson's statement in the PSR is not an admission that he stole the vehicle at
issue in this case. Rather, it is a general admission and apology. It is improper to infer
from a general admission and apology that Larscn committed a particular offense that
was neither charged nor admitted.
Second, it is improper to infer that Larscn is responsible for the theft based on the
lack of record evidence to establish who stole the vehicle. There is no evidence in the

record to show who committed the theft because the State's actions made it unnecessary
to present evidence concerning the theft. The State did not charge Larsen with theft.
Rather, due to a lack of evidence, it charged him with theft by receiving and accepted his
guilty plea to the lesser offense of joyriding. Having eliminated the need to present
evidence regarding the theft, the Stale cannot now claim the lack of evidence regarding
the theft as a reason to hold Larsen liable for the damages incurred during the theft.
Third, the restitution statute did not permit the trial court to order Larsen to pay
restitution for all damages suffered by TUG Auto Brokers. Rather the trial court could
only impose restitution for damages that resulted from LarsciTs criminal activities. Due
to complexities in civil litigation and damage assessment, the civil causes of action
identified by the State are not relevant or helpful. Besides, regardless of whether this
Court looks to civil case law for guidance, the trial court's restitution order was erroneous
because it included damages that did not result from Larsen\s criminal activities. In
particular, it included the vehicle damage even though Larsen did not admit responsibility
for, was not convicted of and did not agree to pay restitution for the vehicle damage.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING LARSEN TO PAY FULL
RESTITUTION FOR THE VEHICLE DAMAGE BECAUSE LARSEN DID
NOT ADMIT HE STOLE OR DAMAGED THE VEHICLE
The restitution statute says w"a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution for
criminal activities for which the defendant did not admit responsibility, was not
convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution/** State v. 1 light. 2008 UT App 118, f p,
2

182 P.3d 922 (citation omitted); see Aplt. Br. at 10-13 (additional citations). This Court
should reverse the restitution order because Larsen did not admit responsibility for. was
not convicted of, and did not agree to pay restitution for the vehicle damage.
First, the Stale argues that Larsen admitted responsibility for and, therefore, agreed
to pay full restitution on the vehicle damage because he "admitted that he stole the
vehicle on April 30 and was in possession of it with intent to deprive on May 6, when he
was stopped and arrested.*' Aple. Br. at 11. The record does not support this argument.
To substantiate its claim, the State cites Larsen\s statement for the PSR. See Aple.
Br. at 11, 14. In the PSR, Larsen admitted meeting a person and:
going with him to still things that wher not ares and having the drive stolen
cars for him and fallow him places with thes cars. . . . I still have done
wrong I think every day how much that they could or may have lost for be
doing this it was not only ther car that I was tacking it was thcr life maby
ther job and something they have worked for for a long time. . . .
R. 72:3. This statement is a general admission and apology. R. 72:3. Nowhere in it docs
Larsen admit he stole the 1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee that was taken on April 30. 2007.
R. 2; 72:3. Nor does he agree to pay restitution for damage done to the vehicle during the
theft. R. 72:3. To conclude from this statement that LarsciTs responsibility for the
vehicle damage is "firmly established.'"' would require the court to attempt to "analyze
[ Larsen's | slate of mind'" and to "mak|c| inferences." State v. Mast, 2001 Ul App 402,
^13.40P.3dll43.
Further, it would require the court to analyze Larscn's state of mind and make
inferences in a way that contradicts the record as a whole. Throughout the case. Larsen
maintained that he did not steal or damage the vehicle at issue. R. 28; 72:3; 130:4. When
3

he was stopped in the vehicle on May 6, he denied stealing it. R. 72:3. Rather, he said
that he borrowed the car from a friend for the night. R. 72:3. As part of his guilty plea,
Larsen admitted that he exercised unlawful control over the vehicle with the intent to
temporarily deprive. R. 28; 130:4. Larsen did not admit that he possessed the vehicle for
more than 24 hours, meaning he did not admit to possessing it until more than five days
after the theft was committed. R. 2; 28; 72:3; 122:3; 130:4; see Utah Code Ann. §41-la1314(3)(a) (2005). Nor did he admit that he damaged the vehicle "in any amount to
facilitate entry into it or its operation." Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314(3)(a), (b)(iii).
Further, even if, through his plea, he admitted that he damaged the vehicle at all, it was
damage in an amount less than $500. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1 a-1314(3)(b)(i); see Aplt.
Br. at 18-20.
Thus, the trial court erred by ordering Larsen to pay restitution for the vehicle
damage because Larsen "'did not admit responsibility'5' or "'agree to pay restitution'" for
the vehicle damage. I light, 2008 UT App 118 at ^[3. Larscn's PSR statement is merely a
general admission and apology. R. 72:3. The standard set by the restitution statute "does
not allow a court to infer" from a general statement of apology that Larsen participated in
a particular crime that was neither charged nor admitted. Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at *j|18.
Second, the State argues that Larsen is responsible to pay restitution for the
vehicle damage because "no evidence supports that anyone else stole the vehicle or
interrupted his exclusive possession of it during the time the owner was deprived of it."
Aple. Br. at 11, 16. Again, this argument relies on inferences. See Mast, 2001 UT App
402 at ^]18 ("Although defendant may have failed to be entirely forthcoming regarding
4

her receipt of the property,'* the restitution statute "docs not allow a court to infer this as
participation in the other crime."); State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, f|[5, 987 P.2d 1289
(per curiam) ("Without making inferences as the trial court did. it cannot be said that
[defendant| admitted responsibility for the murder nor did she agree to pay restitution.'*).
The State admitted that it did not have evidence to prove Larscn stole the vehicle.
R. 1-3; 122:4. Accordingly, it did not charge him with theft. R. 1-3. Rather, it charged
him with theft by receiving and accepted his guilty plea to the lesser offense of joyriding.
R. 1-3; 130. These actions eliminated any need to present evidence concerning the theft.
Thus, because the State's actions are the reason there is no record evidence concerning
theft, the State cannot now argue that Larscn's guilt of theft is "firmly established'" by the
lack of evidence in the record. Compare R. 1-3; 122:4; with Aple. Br. at 11, 16.
Third, the State argues that the trial court's restitution order is proper because
"THG Auto Brokers was entitled to receive pecuniary damages consisting of the damage
to its stolen Jeep." Aple. Br. at 12 (holding omitted). True. Ti 1G Auto Brokcrs's vehicle
was damaged during the theft. Aplt. Br. at 5 & Addendum G. But this does not mean
that THG Auto Brokers is entitled to receive restitution for the vehicle damage from
Larscn. To the contrary, Larscn is only responsible to pay restitution for damages that
resulted from his criminal activities.
For purposes of restitution, a victim is a "person who the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities."* Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(c)(i) (Supp. 2008). Pecuniary damages are limited to those damages
"arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities.'* Utah
5

Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) (Supp. 2008). The defendant's criminal activities arc limited
to the "offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an
admission of committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(b); see
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(2) (Supp. 2008) (same); Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a302(5)(a) (Supp. 2008) ("For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense," the
offense only includes "criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court
or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution.").
In other words, "ca defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal
activities for which the defendant did not admit responsibility, was not convicted, or did
not agree to pay restitution.5" Might, 2008 UT App 118 at ^3 (citation omitted); sec Aplt.
Br. at 10-13 (additional citations). Because Larscn did not admit responsibility for, was
not convicted of, and did not agree to pay restitution for the vehicle damage, the trial
court erred by ordering him to pay restitution for the vehicle damage. See Aplt. Br. at 1418; supra at pp. 3-5.
For similar reasons, the State's citation to civil actions that TUG Auto Brokers
might be able to bring against the person who stole the vehicle is immaterial. Aple. Br. at
9-13. It is questionable whether TUG Auto Brokers could prevail in a civil suit against
Larscn for conversion or trespass to chattel because it would have to prove that the
vehicle damage was the '"natural and proximate result of [Larscn\s| wrong/" State v.
Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417.1fl|9. 12. 82 P.3d 211 (citation omitted); see Fcnn v. MLcads
Enterprises. Inc.. 2004 Uf App 412, f||29 n.9. 103 P.3d 156 (relying on Intel Corp. v.
6

Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) to define elements of trespass to chattel), rev'd on other
grounds, 2006 UT 8, 137 P.3d 706; Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 302 (holding "trespass to chattels
'lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal property has
proximately caused injury" (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)); c£. Walker v. Union
Pacific R. Co., 844 P.2d 335, 343 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting "doctrine of trespass
to chattels has fallen into general disuse" (citation omitted)).
Further, even if THG Auto Brokers could prevail in a civil suit, it is questionable
whether it could recover the cost of the vehicle damage from Larscn, rather than from the
person who stole the vehicle and caused the damage, because it is not clear under Utah
law whether damages in intentional tort cases arc assessed through comparative fault or
joint and several liability. See Jcdrzicwski v. Smith, 2005 UT 85, «,|25, 128 P.3d 1146
(declining to "address the question of whether" damages against "intentional tortfeasors"
arc assessed through comparative fault or joint and several liability); Field v. Boycr Co.,
L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1998) (stating in dicta that Utah's "legislature included
intentional acts in its comparative fault scheme").
The question is immaterial here, however, because Utah's restitution statute says a
defendant only owes restitution for pecuniary damages that resulted from the offense of
which he was convicted or the criminal conduct for which he admitted responsibility to
the sentencing court. Sec Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201 (l)(b); 77-38a-102(2); 77-38a302(5)(a).
In both Corbitt and State v. Twitchcll, 832 P.2d 866 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the
defendants admitted responsibility for the pecuniary damages alleged. Sjcc Corbitt, 2003
7

UT App 417 at Tf 12 (holding defendant "'Tirmly established* his responsibility for the
pecuniary damages resulting from his criminal conduct" because he admitted "his guilt
on the charge of possessing a stolen vehicle" (citation omitted)); Twitchcll, 832 P.2d at
870 (holding defendant "admitted the very facts and elements necessary to prove liability
in a civil proceeding for conversion" because his "guilty plea to theft by deception
established his control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to
deprive"). Whereas, as explained previously, Larsen did not admit responsibility for, was
not convicted of, and did not agree to pay restitution for the vehicle damage. See Aplt.
Br. 14-18; supra at pp. 3-5. Thus, the trial court erred by ordering him to pay restitution
for the vehicle damage. Sec id.
CONCLUSION
Larsen asks this Court to reverse the restitution order, impose a restitution order
for $282, and remand for such further proceedings as may now be proper. Alternatively,
he asks this Court to reverse and remand for a new restitution hearing.
SUBMITTED this *~\ day of July, 2009.

__

<p^y<i^^

LORIJ SLPPI
'
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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